Abstract. With the growing deployment of IPv6, the question arises whether and to what extent this new protocol is co-deployed with IPv4 on existing hardware or whether new hardware or proxy solutions are deployed. Understanding the resulting cross-dependencies between IPv4 and IPv6 hosts will add a significant level of insight into Internet structure and resilience research. In this work we present an active measurement technique to determine whether an IPv4-IPv6 address pair resides on the same physical host. This technique is based on measuring clock skew through TCP timestamps, and introduces new capabilities to classify nonlinear clock skews. We achieve 97.7% accuracy on a ground truth data set of 458 hosts. We prove this technique's value by applying it to 371k sibling candidates, of which we classify 80k as siblings. We release the classified siblings among other data and code from this work for public use.
Introduction
The emergence of IPv6 in the global Internet offers interesting possibilities for studies to compare IPv4 and IPv6 structures and attributes in the Internet. An important prerequisite for such studies is the identification of related IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, and the level of relation. Associated A and AAAA ressource records from DNS queries establish that the related IPv4-IPv6 addresses provide the same service, a relation level suitable for many security or user-centric studies. In this work, we focus on a narrower sibling [5] relation, which is established if an IPv4-IPv6 address pair is located on the same physical machine, a setup also called dual-stack. This level of relation is important for a number of research areas, including comparison of routing paths or geolocation of IP addresses. We establish this level of relation by comparing clock skew of remote hosts obtained through the TCP Timestamp option [5] . Our novel approach is capable to identify unique nonlinear patterns, caused by e.g., clock resets or clock adjustments. We evaluate our method on a large ground truth data set and achieve >95% on accuracy, precision, recall and specificity metrics. We further apply our method to a large-scale data set: derived from 162M domain names, we measure 364k unique IPv4-IPv6 sibling candidates, of which we can confirm 80k as siblings. We argue that this proves the applicability and value of our technique for large-scale comparative IPv4-IPv6 studies.
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Our contributions are as follows:
-We identify a large ground truth data set, with many hosts exhibiting nonlinear clock skew -We introduce algorithms with nonlinear capabilities while maintaining the good metrics of existing work on mainly linear data sets -We apply our algorithm to a large-scale (hundred thousands of IP address pairs) data set and classify ≈80,000 siblings -We share data and implementation with the community The remainder of this work is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss background, related work and the existing algorithms of Kohno, and Beverley and Berger. In Section 3, we present our improved algorithm, and apply it to our ground truth data set in Section 4. Section 5 explains our large-scale application and its findings. We discuss ethical considerations and data release in Section 6, concluded by a summary and future work in Section 7.
Background and Related Work
This section gives background and related work in three categories: Remote Clock Skew Measurements, Remote Identification, and comparative IPv4-IPv6 studies.
Remote Clock Skew Measurements: Accurate time-keeping on computing machinery is a notoriously difficult problem: precisely oscillating hardware is prohibitively expensive for most machines. The dominant protocol to synchronize low-precision machines, NTP, exhibits many difficulties even after decades of development [21] . Hence, clocks in most devices in the Internet do not run in sync with true time, but deviate from it to an extent that is measurable over the Internet. Protocols or protocol extensions that include timestamps from a remote machine allow for measuring clock skew with good accuracy by comparing local and remote timestamps over time. This skew can be used to remotely identify network devices. Foundations in this field were laid by Paxson [16] in 1998 and Moon et al. [14] in 1999. Kohno et al. [12] in 2005 first apply these techniques to TCP timestamps. They conduct a variety of case studies on the influence of external factors on timestamp behavior, e.g., power-saving or virtualization settings. Beverly and Berger [5] apply these contributions to the new field of IPv4-IPv6 sibling detection and refine existing algorithms as follows: First, they compare TCP option signatures to filter out non-siblings, leveraging presence and order of options, but usually not their values. Second, they classify the kind of TCP timestamp behavior (e.g., random, monotonic, non-monotic) to again filter for non-siblings. In the third step they compare the angle of two clock skews to a chosen threshold to determine a sibling/nonsibling relationship. A variation of their algorithm classifies hosts with negligible skew as unknown. They achieve very good metrics (99.6% precision), but acknowledge their comparably small ground truth data set of 61 hosts might be prone to overfitting. Some of the classification steps (such as detection of random timestamps) miss algorithmic description. If those steps are conducted by human inspection, they are difficult to scale to larger data sets.
Other Remote Identificaton Techniques: Determining whether a set of IP addresses belong to the same router is an important and well-understood problem in Internet research. Scientific tools such as Ally [19] , Radar Gun [4] and MIDAR [11] use IP Identification (IP ID) header values to answer this question, exploiting the fact that the IP ID counter is commonly shared between interfaces. Unlike IPv4, IPv6 only offers IP Identification values in an extension header for fragmented packets [RFC 2460 ]. In 2013, Luckie et al. [13] published speedtrap, which uses forced packet fragmentation for alias resolution in IPv6. Beverly et al. [6] in 2015 used IPv6 identification values to measure router uptime.
IPv4-IPv6 comparative studies: Czyz et al. [7] in 2016 compared security characteristics of dual-stack hosts by for example comparing open ports for related A and AAAA records. Please note that their work does not imply dual-stack IPv4-IPv6 addresses, but compares the security settings at a domain level.
Improved Sibling Detection Algorithm
This section describes how we acquire a ground truth, apply nonlinear splines, detect various skew classes and finally formalize an improved sibling classification algorithm.
Acquiring a Ground Truth Data Set: Our ground truth data set contains 458 sibling entries which are obtained from several sources including RIPE Atlas probes [17] , NLNOG RING probes [2] , and servers whose administrators confirmed the sibling relationship to us. This data set spans 373 unique Autonomous Systems (ASes) and 40 countries as demonstrated by Table 1 , and significantly exceeds the data set used by Beverly and Berger. Please note that this data set allows for testing both sibling and non-sibling relationships, as non-siblings can be created by mixing addresses from different servers. When implementing and applying Beverly and Berger's algorithm to our ground truth data set, we quickly noticed subpar performance. We argue this is due to the large quantity of nonlinear clock skews in our data set, while their data set apparently was dominated by linear skews. Hence, Beverly and Berger's algorithm performs well on siblings with linear clock skew, but has little discriminative power on nonlinear data sets. We develop an improved algorithm with added capabilities to (i) classify skews as linear or nonlinear and (ii) compare nonlinear skews based on spline matchings. Nonlinear Splines: There are various options for the deployment of nonlinear splines. For this work, we found it well suited to select 13 equidistant offset points and fit cubic splines in an approximative manner through these. These values were determined by trying various settings and both comparing numeric results and inspecting the resulting splines for over/under-fitting tendencies. approach for both siblings and non-siblings. Please note the spline's ability to both fit high and low dynamics well. In the next step, we minimize the area between the two splines by shifting the y-offset of one slope. The minimal area is then a single float value put into further steps of the algorithm.
Skew Classes: Before discussing our improved algorithm in detail, we present four basic skew classes observed in our data set, displayed in Figure 2 : (a), a sibling candidate may exhibit negligible skew, i.e., both the IPv4 and the IPv6 timestamps do not run significantly different from each other and from our reference clock. In this case, no reliable classification is possible. (b), both the IPv4 and IPv6 clock may follow a clear linear trend over time. This is the prime case that existing algorithms are tailored for and classification is quite reliable for these cases. (c), sibling may exhibit nonlinear skew. This is typically caused by time synchronization daemons adjusting local clock speed to asymptotically approach the reference clock. This method is beneficial to local applications as it maintains clock monotonicity. Also, the resulting curves are quite distinctive and permit a rather confident sibling match, cf. Figure 2c . (d), clock adjustments can be made abruptly, resulting in large jumps in clock offset. This keeps the remote clock skew linear as its frequency is unchanged. However, the resulting non-monotonic pattern is not suited for linear matching. Intuitively, piece-wise linear regression would be a good match for the resulting patterns, but we found our nonlinear splines to also work well (cf. Figure 2d ). if spline∆ > λ1 =⇒ Non-sibling Values used: α = .81, β = .2, γ = .00005, = 1.5, µ = .47, θ = 14, λ1 = .63, λ2 = 2.3 Improved Classification Algorithm: In this Section we discuss the complete and formalized classification algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1. Similar to Beverly and Berger, we first compare the set and order of TCP options offered by sibling candidates. We also find the wscale option value to be equal for
We then match nonlinear splines and calculate the minimal area between them. Based on whether the overall dynamics are small or large, we apply different thresholds λ 1 or λ 2 . We found this simplistic logic to provide good results on our data set, but acknowledge that this step could potentially be improved by means of finer tuning, for example by scaling the threshold λ by the dynamics.
We also developed an alternative algorithm #2, which, similarly to Beverly's and Berger's alternative algorithm, defines an "unknown" zone around certain thresholds. We recommend this algorithm #2 for use cases that favor a low false positive/false negative rate over a small "unknown" group. We classify, for example, the 0.6 < θ < 2 area unknown in our second algorithm. Both algorithms offer many subtleties, and we recommend our source code and [18] for a detailed reference.
Results of Ground Truth Application
This section discusses the results of applying both Beverly's and Berger's algorithm and our nonlinear algorithms 1 and 2 to our data set. As discussed before, Beverly's and Berger's algorithm offers good performance on data sets with mainly linear skew, cf. first row of Table 2 . When applied to our data set, which largely consists of hosts offering nonlinear skews, its performance quickly degrades to low accuracy and recall values, largely caused by classifying essentially all hosts as non-siblings with resulting very high false negative counts. Our nonlinear algorithms can restore this performance for data sets dominated by hosts with nonlinear skew. We offer two alternatives of our algorithm, with the latter avoiding to take a decision for very close calls by introducing a "safety margin". We argue that, depending on the use case, algorithm 1 or 2 might be a better choice, but training the parameters on an even larger data set could improve confidence levels. We also confirm that TCP signature comparison is a very effective first-order falsifying metric: Different TCP options correctly filter out 77% of the nonsiblings in our data set. Please also note that our algorithms are a superset of Beverly's and Berger's algorithm: we deploy a slightly modified version of their technique to hosts with linear clock skew, but conduct spline mapping for hosts with nonlinear clock skew. Encouraged from these positive results in our ground truth data set, we argue that algorithm 2 is suited for one of our initial motivations: To produce a large-scale set of dual-stack IPv4-IPv6 addresses with high confidence level and very few false positives, i.e., non-siblings falsely classified as siblings.
Large-Scale Application & Results
We now apply our algorithm on a larger scale to evaluate its suitability for finding sibling-pairs for large-scale structural Internet studies. We first identify sibling candidates by resolving 162 million domain names for both A and AAAA records. These are then filtered against our blacklist and IP address pairs are formed for all possible A and AAAA combinations per domain, named "Sibling Candidates". The statistics of this process, detailed by top-level domain and IPv4-IPv6 resource records, are laid out in Table 3 . We find the resulting number of sibling candidates to be heavily constrained by only few domains reporting AAAA records: We obtain only 6M AAAA records compared to 168M A records. With increased IPv6 deployment, the resulting number of candidates will quickly multiply. Please note that the number of sibling candidates typically exceeds the number of IPv6 records as we pair all IPv4 resource records for a domain with all IPv6 resource records of a domain as sibling candidates. The resulting 8.9M candidates are further processed, depicted in Table 4 : First, unique IP addresses for both IPv4 and IPv6 are extracted. As sibling candidates are of the format <domain, IPv4 address, IPv6 address>, the reduction by one magnitude when cutting and reducing to unique IPv4 or IPv6 addresses is not surprising. We then scan the resulting unique IPv4-IPv6 addresses with zmap [8] on TCP port 80. We leverage our previously developed IPv6-capable version of zmap for this [10] . This step shows most machines to be reachable on TCP port 80. Unreachable machines might be available on TCP port 443 only, or run other custom configurations. It also eliminates machines that do not offer the TCP Timestamp option, which is a prerequisite to applying our technique. We find 57% (IPv4) and 69% (IPv6) of responsive IP addresses to offer the TCP Timestamp option. The higher percentage for IPv6 could be caused by IPv6 being offered by newer machines with more modern TCP configurations.
As we use the TCP option fingerprint of a remote host to filter for non-siblings, we extend zmap with TCP options capabilities. We chose to form a complex TCP options payload as this offers more possibilities for different TCP stacks to offer different replies. We ask for the set of options of: <SACK permitted, Timestamps, Window Scale, TCP Fast Open, Unknown, MPTCP>. We include an Unknown option (by using a reserved option identifier) as this may also trigger a range of different responses, from simple mirroring to correctly dropping the unknown option. However, this step removes only few hundred non-siblings in this large-scale data set, opposed to the about 77% of non-siblings in our ground truth data set. This is likely caused by the fact that we mismatched IP addresses of different servers to create non-siblings in our ground truth data set, while the sibling candidates in this large-scale data set are derived from corresponding A and AAAA addresses. These corresponding A and AAAA records might, even if not physical siblings, at least use similar operating systems and configurations with the same TCP stack. Furthermore, the large-scale data set is rather uniform of the class web servers, compared to our ground truth data set which incorporates routers and other server types.
After these filtering steps, we again want to come to a sibling candidate format, consisting of domain name and according IP addresses. For this, we filter the prior list of sibling candidates for entries where both addresses were not filtered out through the aforementioned steps. This assembles a remainder of 6.6M sibling candidates, which represent 371k candidate pairs (unique combinations of IPv4 and IPv6 address). This reduction is due to an m:n-relationship between domains and IP address pairs, which is further explored in Figure 3 . From Subfigure 3a we see that most (>92%) domains only reply with 1 IP address pair, but outliers responded to DNS queries with up to 243 IP address pairs. Subfigure 3b shows that IP address pairs are frequently (>33%) shared between several domains, an expected effect of using web hosting providers. We even found one IP address pair serving over 155k domains. This effect leads to an arithmetic average of 17.8 domains per IP address pair, explaining the large difference between candidates (6.6M) and candidate IP address pairs (371k). We then proceed to fingerprint the 371k unique candidate pairs through active measurements. To obtain a sufficient amount of fingerprints, we connect to every IP address for 10 hours, with a target of at least 1 packet per minute containing a TCP timestamp. We leverage the TCP Keepalive options to avoid establishing a new connection every minute, but found many servers to quickly close our connections after few keepalive packets. For every connection made, we request a random HTTP object to avoid caching proxies from handling our connection. As this approach is resource-heavy, requiring a full TCP and HTTP connection for every IP address, we could only measure 10k IP address pairs simultaneously on our machine. Our measurement stack consisted of a Python3 master firing up thousands of urllib3 threads on multiple cores. Moving to a C library or high-speed packet-processing frameworks such as DPDK [1] or MoonGen/libmoon [9] might significantly reduce the kernel packet processing overhead and allow for larger batches. To deal with these limitations, we split our 371k unique candidate pairs into batches of 10k addresses, measuring for several days from several servers. We acknowledge this might be considered intrusive by administrators of measured hosts, which we discuss in detail in Section 6.
Through our measurement, we obtain a sufficient count of timestamps for 364k of 371k address pairs, the missing caused by either transient timeouts or other problems. When applying our algorithm explained in Section 3, we confirm 79,965 (21.95%) candidate pairs to be siblings (cf. Table 5 ), 75% as non-siblings and 2% as unknown. While this sibling percentage may seem low, several explanations are offered: First, our algorithm is geared toward a low false positive rate, which comes with erring on the unknown/non-sibling side when taking a decision. Second, many domains are hosted by web hosters or CDNs, which might deploy IPv6 proxies instead of dual-stack deployment for quick IPv6 reachability. Furthermore, load balancers might be deployed to serve content from a variety of distinct servers. Given our aim of identifying a multitude of diverse siblings for Internet structural research, we see the identification of ≈80,000 siblings as a success. In further analysis, we find those pairs to cover 2,847 Autonomous Systems and 9,466 prefixes. We argue that this diverse set allows for in-depth study of Internet-wide structural behavior of IPv4-IPv6 relations by the scientific community.
Ethical Considerations and Data Release
In this section we discuss the ethical considerations guiding this work and the release of our data and code to the public for reproducibility and use by other research groups.
Ethical Considerations: We follow an internal multi-party approval process before any measurement activities are carried out. This approval process incorporates the proposal of Partridge and Allman [15] to assess whether the collection of data can induce harm on individuals and whether the collected data reveals private information. We draw the following conclusions from this process: Our active measurements can cause anomalous traffic patterns on the remote end, resulting in investigative effort for system administrators. To minimize the intrusiveness of our active network measurements we implement the following procedures: First, we set up a website on the scanning machines which explains our measurement activity in detail, combined with descriptive reverse DNS names and a dedicated abuse e-mail address. Second, we maintain a blacklist of hosts and networks which will not be scanned in any measurements conducted by our chair. Third, we reply to every e-mail received on the abuse address. Throughout this experiment, we were contacted by seven affected users, of which one user requested blacklisting which we immediately set into effect. The other users usually were curious, some even happy to further assist research. Fourth, we request HTTP objects prefixed by /research scan to allow quick identification of our connections. Furthermore, based on user discussions, we will respect robots.txt and set a descriptive HTTP user agent in future work. To conclude, we argue that no individual was harmed as a result of our active measurements. As the data (IP addresses, DNS names, and latency measurements) bear little privacy intrusion and was obtained from publicly available sources, we fully release the data used in this experiment.
Data Release: We publish our curated ground truth data set, acquired raw data, and developed source code for both reproducibility and use by other researchers. The code is accessible via https://github.com/tumi8/siblings, with directions how to obtain raw data from our servers.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we performed a large-scale classification of IPv4-IPv6 sibling candidates obtained using TCP timestamps. We significantly extended existing sibling detection algorithms to work well on hosts exhibiting nonlinear clock skew, which can be caused by clock adjustments through a time daemon. We collected a large and diverse ground truth data set, in which a majority of hosts exhibited nonlinear clock skew. We found existing linear algorithms to perform badly on these hosts. We evaluated our nonlinear algorithm against the ground truth data set and achieve results in line with existing work for linear data sets. This provides a major contribution to extend the methodology to a more diverse set of hosts. We then applied our methodology against a large-scale data set of 162M domains, confirming 80k sibling pairs out of 371k sibling candidates. This proves efficiency and effectiveness of our methodology, and its capability to produce a large number of confirmed sibling pairs for Internet studies. We release our ground truth, code and data to the scientific community to allow for reproducibility and further research in this area.
Future Work: One direction of future work is the further improvement of our algorithm. For this, the curation of ever larger sibling ground truth data sets is key, a process we hope to start with the release of our ground truth data set on GitHub. Better fitting linear regression techniques to partially linear skews, caused by clock resets, is a direct improvement idea. Also, different and more robust techniques for outlier removal, such as frequency domain analysis, could be investigated. Furthermore, a reduction of the 10-hour measurement period probably would be possible for a set of hosts that exhibit clear characteristics right at the beginning of the measurement. This would require integration of measurement and classification, which introduces the challenge to maintain the efficiency of the approach.
